LAGOS, Nigeria, November 18, 2026 — A new research report examining some of Africa’s largest startup collapses has put investor accountability and business transparency under renewed scrutiny, estimating that 20 major failures in Kenya, Nigeria and Ghana raised about $923 million while only $5 million was documented as returned to investors. The findings are contained in the Africa Failure Index — Where the Money Went, produced by the Midlo Research Institute, the research arm of the Midlothian Angel Network, in partnership with Nigerian financial publication Nairametrics. Nairametrics’ report summary and Wisevoter’s coverage outline the central findings.

The headline figure is striking, but the researchers caution against treating it as a definitive loss calculation. The $5 million represents returns that could be documented publicly, not necessarily every amount recovered through private settlements, debt repayments or other arrangements. Nairametrics says none of the 20 companies has an audited investor-loss figure on the public record, while 15 have no disclosed recovery figure. The report therefore sets a ceiling: capital lost cannot exceed $917.9 million, and the actual amount may be lower. The report’s methodology and caveats are central to interpreting the numbers.

An African professional working on a laptop in an office in Cameroon.
Illustrative photograph of a professional working on a laptop in Cameroon, 23 October 2017. Photo: Minette Lontsie, CC BY-SA 4.0. Not a photograph of a company named in the Africa Failure Index. Image source · Licence.

At least $149.6 million, or 16 per cent of the total capital raised, was debt or convertible instruments rather than straightforward equity. That distinction matters because lenders and secured creditors can have claims that rank ahead of ordinary shareholders when a business fails. The report’s figures therefore do not mean that venture investors alone absorbed the entire gap between the amount raised and the amount publicly documented as returned. A separate analysis by StartupActu also stresses that the absence of audited loss and recovery records makes the $5 million figure a measure of disclosed information, not a complete accounting of every financial outcome.

The country breakdown shows how concentrated the cases are. Ten Kenyan companies account for approximately $715.1 million, or 77 per cent of the total raised. Eight Nigerian companies raised a combined $104.7 million, while two Ghanaian companies accounted for $103.1 million. The largest Nigerian case in the ranking is biotechnology company 54gene, which raised about $45 million. These are the report’s selected, verifiable cases rather than a complete count of every startup that has closed across the three countries. Nairametrics and Wisevoter provide the country totals and ranking context.

Members of a Nigerian technology company's design team working in an office.
Archival photograph of the design team of a Nigerian technology company in Lagos, 4 October 2017. Photo: Nene Obichie, CC BY-SA 4.0. Illustrative image, not a photograph of a company named in the report. Image source · Licence.

The report identifies asset-heavy business models as a major source of exposure. Seven companies with substantial physical operations — including trucks, warehouses, cooking equipment, fuel points and distribution networks — account for $548.8 million, or 59 per cent of the total. Distribution and supply-chain businesses represent six of the 20 cases and 46 per cent of the money, while fintech companies make up nine cases but account for 19 per cent of the dollars. The analysis suggests that expansion can become especially costly when a company must finance physical assets, logistics and staff before it has built a sustainable core business. The Midlo findings as reported by Nairametrics detail the sector split.

Several patterns recur in the case files. Fourteen of the 20 companies expanded into new markets or pivoted into additional products before their core business was working reliably. The report says seven lost a founder or senior leader before the end, while seven had an insider-led or unsuccessful final fundraising attempt. It also identifies $228.3 million of dated capital entering the selected companies in 2021 alone — more than the combined amount dated to 2022 and 2023. Six of the ten largest African cases collapsed in 2024 or later. These findings describe patterns in the sample; they do not prove that any single decision caused a particular company’s collapse. StartupActu’s analysis and Nairametrics’ summary discuss the recurring warning signs.

A small team of Nigerian youths working together on a creative project from home.
Illustrative photograph of Nigerian youths forming a small team for a handcraft and creative project, 26 September 2017. Photo: Adetolaju Ademola Femi, CC BY-SA 4.0. Not a photograph of a company named in the Africa Failure Index. Image source · Licence.

Currency risk also appears in the study. The researchers flag at least six companies — Kippa, Edukoya, Pivo, Float, Lipa Later and Okra — as having visible exposure after the naira’s 2023 devaluation. When a startup raises money or takes on obligations in dollars but earns much of its revenue in local currency, a sharp exchange-rate move can increase the local cost of servicing debt, buying imported equipment or meeting other dollar-linked commitments. The report identifies the exposure but does not provide a full audited currency-loss calculation for each company. Nairametrics’ account of the report lists the affected businesses.

The findings arrive as African technology funding has been recovering, although headline totals differ across research organisations. Partech’s 2025 Africa Tech Venture Capital Report put combined equity and debt funding at $4.1 billion, including a record $1.64 billion in debt. Disrupt Africa’s annual funding report counted more than $1.6 billion across 178 funded startups. The figures are not directly interchangeable because the reports use different datasets and funding classifications, but both show why better information about debt, equity, company closures and investor outcomes is important. Partech’s report and Disrupt Africa’s funding report provide the underlying market context.

The Africa Failure Index is described as a ranking of the 20 largest collapses that could be verified from public information, not a census of all startup closures. Its case information is based on material available up to October 5, 2026, so later developments may not be reflected. The institute says it grades the strength of evidence separately from its assessment of possible causes and attributes allegations to the publications that originally reported them. It also discloses a connection to two companies examined, including Payday, which is part of the Midlothian Angel Network’s portfolio. The disclosure and methodology note should be read alongside the headline figures; background on the research organisation is available from Midlothian Angel Network.

For founders and investors, the report’s central lesson is not that risk-taking should stop. It is that growth plans need to be matched by unit economics, credible governance, transparent reporting and realistic funding structures. Businesses with large physical footprints may need more disciplined working-capital planning, while companies exposed to foreign currencies need to stress-test exchange-rate shocks. Investors, meanwhile, need clearer information about what happens after a company enters administration or winds down. Partech’s funding analysis and Disrupt Africa’s market data underline the scale of capital moving through the ecosystem.

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The report’s most important contribution may be its attempt to make startup failure more visible. Africa’s technology ecosystem often publicises fundraising rounds, valuations and expansion plans, while information about liquidation, creditor recoveries and investor losses can be difficult to find. A more complete public record would help founders learn from failed business models and allow investors to assess risk with better evidence. The $923 million figure is a useful starting point for that discussion, but it should not be mistaken for a verified amount lost.

The distinction between documented returns and actual recovery is essential. A reported $5 million is what the research could trace in the public record; it does not establish that every other dollar disappeared or that investors recovered nothing privately. The absence of audited loss figures is itself a serious transparency problem, but it also means the headline ratio must be handled carefully. Future editions will be more valuable if they can add court and insolvency records, audited statements, creditor outcomes and updates on companies whose status has changed.

For African venture capital to mature, success stories and failure records must be treated as two parts of the same evidence base. More disciplined expansion, stronger boards, better disclosure and clearer treatment of debt could improve decision-making without discouraging innovation. The goal should not be to eliminate entrepreneurial risk, but to make that risk easier to understand, price and manage.

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